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A Dialogue on Death & Deference:
Gonzales v. Oregon
STACY A. TROMBLEt
INTRODUCTION

Oscar Wilde once said that "life is far too important a
thing to ever talk seriously about."' Until rather recently,
the same thing could be said about America's approach to
death and end of life decision-making. The protracted legal
battle surrounding Terri Schiavo2 has brought many of
these issues to the forefront of the political, social, and legal
agenda. The unprecedented flurry of midnight legislation
crafted by Congress and subsequently signed by the
President in that case underscores the struggle that can
ensue when legitimate state interests clash with individual
autonomy. 3 The Schiavo case presented some unique issues,
principally because Ms. Schiavo was in a persistent
vegetative state and unable to make her own healthcare
decisions. 4 While end of life decision-making for the
mentally incompetent raises unsettled and complex legal
questions, the latest legal battle centers around a bold
Oregon law that permits mentally competent, terminally ill

t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2007; M.S.W., State
University of New York at Buffalo, 2007. I would like to thank the members of
the Buffalo Law Review and my sister, Jennifer Tromble, for editorial
assistance. I would also like to thank my husband, James Bartoszczyk, for his
unwavering support and encouragement. This Note is dedicated to my parents,
Gerard and Carol Tromble, who lived and died with dignity.
1. Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere's Fan 6 (Dover Publications 1998) (1893).
2. See generally Manuel Roig-Franzia, Long Legal Battle Over as Schiavo
Dies, WASH. POST, April 1, 2005, at Al.
3. For an excellent discussion of the Schiavo case, see generally WILLIAM H.
COLBY, UNPLUGGED: RECLAIMING OUR RIGHT TO DIE IN AMERICA (2006); see also

Jack M. Beermann, Federal Court Self-Preservation and Terri Schiavo, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 553 (2006).
4. See id.
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adults to end their lives. Oregon's Death With Dignity Act 5
is the first and only legislation in the country that permits
physician-assisted suicide. It is a carefully tailored piece of
legislation which closely delimits the circumstances
whereby an individual may seek a lethal dose of
prescription medication from their physician. 6 The
legislation has weathered several legal challenges. The
latest challenge was an Interpretive Rule, 7 issued by then
Attorney General John Ashcroft, that announced that
pursuant to provisions of the Controlled Substances Act,
physicians that write a prescription pursuant to the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act could lose their prescriptionwriting privileges. The Interpretive Rule would effectively
nullify the Oregon law. The litigation that resulted wound
its way to the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Oregon,8 the
subject of this Note.
In order to grasp the significance of this case, the
reader must first understand the factual and legal context
that gave rise to it. Accordingly, this Note begins with a
discussion of Supreme Court precedents that set the stage
for the current debate. The next section gives an overview
of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act and the Controlled
Substances Act, the two pieces of legislation that collide in
this case. Next, the majority and dissenting opinions are
summarized in some depth, with an emphasis on the
Court's deference arguments. Finally, the Note concludes
with a discussion of the prospects for a continued dialogue
on the substantive issues of end of life decision making
given the long history of congressional attempts to prohibit
physician-assisted suicide and the reluctance of other states
to join the conversation.

5. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995
(2005).
6. See id.
7. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001).
8. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
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I. CAUSATION & INTENT AT THE END OF LIFE: A
JURISPRUDENTIAL LINE IN THE SAND

American courts are much more willing to support the
withdrawal or refusal of life-sustaining treatment than to
advocate for physician-assisted
suicide (PAS). 9 An
individual's right to refuse treatment has its roots in the
common law action of trespass 10 and now enjoys
constitutional protection. In the landmark case Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health," the Supreme
Court held that a mentally competent adult has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment or in removing life-sustaining
medical care. 12 The Court also recognized that, under
certain conditions, a surrogate could substitute his or her
judgment in the best interests of an incapacitated
individual, if that individual's wishes were unknown. 13
While this liberty interest in refusing or removing lifesustaining treatment is grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is not an absolute right. It is subject to a
balancing test that weighs the individual's interests against
4
those of the State.'
Once an individual's liberty interest in refusing or
withdrawing
life-sustaining
treatment
was
firmly
established, proponents of an affirmative right to die sought
judicial sanction of physician-assisted suicide. In 1997,
Washington v. Glucksberg15 and its companion case, Vacco
9. See generally Kristine Karnezis, Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment
Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (1979).
10. The common law action of trespass and the legal maxim of patient
autonomy were well established in the United States as early as 1914. In
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914), Justice Cardozo
stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault ..
11. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
12. See id.
13. See id. at 273.
14. See id. at 279; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (Court balancing the
individual's refusal to take a smallpox vaccine against State's interest to
prevent the spread of disease).
15. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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v. Quill,16 reached the Supreme Court. In both cases,
terminally ill patients and their physicians sought to
overturn state statutes that prohibited PAS. Both attempts
failed. Respondents in both cases claimed that there was
little, if any, distinction between the removal of lifesustaining medical treatment and PAS. 17 The 'Court
responded that while "the decision to commit suicide with
the assistance of another may be just as personal and
profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, 8. . . it has never enjoyed similar legal
protection."'
In Vacco v. Quill, the Court held that the difference
between the well-recognized liberty interest in refusing or
removing treatment and PAS is one of causation and
intent. 19 The jurisprudential line in the sand was thus
drawn by distinguishing between letting a patient die and
causing a patient to die. In both Glucksberg and Quill, the
Court took pains to articulate the myriad of State interests
involved in a decision to prohibit PAS. 20 It would be a
mistake, however, to deem either opinion as a blanket
rejection of the practice. Instead, the Court suggested that
the statutes prohibiting PAS in both Washington and New
York are constitutional because their legislatures-the
popularly elected representatives of the people-have
rationally related the ban on PAS to legitimate government
interests. 2 ' Under this paradigm, when a state-either by
referendum or by legislation--chooses to legalize PAS, the
law is not inherently unconstitutional. Instead of ending
the important dialogue around PAS, the Court expressed a
debate to continue, as it
desire that its holding "permit [the]
22
should in a democratic society."

16. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
17. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725; Quill, 521 U.S. at 798.

18. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
19. Quill, 521 U.S. at 794.
20. These legitimate government interests include "prohibiting intentional
killing and preserving life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role as
their patients' healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice
and psychological pressures to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide
towards euthanasia." Id. at 808-09.

21. See id.
22. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
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It is against this legal landscape that the Oregon Death
With Dignity Act and the latest legal challenge to its
existence must be viewed.
II. COLLIDING LEGISLATION

A. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act
The Oregon Death With Diginity Act ("ODWDA" or "the
Act") allows a mentally competent Oregon resident who is
over the age of eighteen and whose terminal illness will
result in death within six months to request a lethal
prescription from their physician. 23 If a resident chooses to
end his or her life in accordance with the Act's provisions,
the resulting death is not considered suicide under Oregon
24
law.

Physicians acting pursuant to the ODWDA prescribe
controlled substances for the express purpose of helping
their terminally ill patients to end their lives. 25 Oregon
residents are only eligible for the lethal prescription if
several criteria are met. 26 First, their attending physician
must certify that they have a terminal and irreversible
illness which will, in their reasonable medical judgment,
result in death within six months, and a consulting
physician must concur. 27 Physicians must ensure that the
request for medication is voluntary and informed; 28 patients
who might be suffering from a psychiatric illness such as
23. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2005). For a succint summary of the Act's
provisions, see OREGON DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON
OREGON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT (2006), http://www.oregon.govlDHS/ph/pas/

docs/year8.pdf.
24. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880 (2005).
25. OREGON DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 23, at 7.

26. These criteria include, among other things, two oral requests, a written
request signed in the presence of two witnesses, and a waiting period.
Physicians are mandated to inform their patients of alternatives to assisted
suicide including hospice services. Physicians can also request, but cannot
require, that the patient's next-of-kin be notified of the prescription request. See
id. at 7-8.
27. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.820 (2005).
28. See id. § 127.830.
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depression must be referred to counseling.29 A second
consulting physician must also examine the patient and
medical records to confirm the primary physician's
findings. 30 All physicians operating under the Act must be
registered with the Oregon State Board of Medical
Examiners
and
the
Federal
Drug
Enforcement
Administration.
In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Attorney General challenged
the ODWDA by invoking his powers under the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) to threaten deregistration of
physicians who prescribe controlled substances for the
purpose of assisting a suicide. Accordingly, before
proceeding to the holding and reasoning of the case, a brief
discussion of the CSA is in order.
B. The Controlled Substances Act
The Controlled Substances Act, 31 Title II of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, is the legal foundation of the government's fight
against drug abuse. The CSA categorizes all regulated
controlled substances into one of five schedules, with the
placement of drugs on a particular schedule being governed
by an assessment of the substance's medicinal value,
harmfulness, and potential for abuse or addiction. Schedule
132 is reserved for the most dangerous drugs that have no
recognized medical use, while Schedule V33 is the
classification used for the least dangerous drugs.
Proceedings to add, delete, or change the schedule of a drug
or other substance may be initiated by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), or by petition from any

29. See id. § 127.825.
30. The Death With Dignity Act requires doctors to extensively document
the patient's diagnosis and prognosis as well as all requests made by, and
evaluations of, the terminally ill patient. Copies of these forms are available at
http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/index.shtml. For a complete list of physician
responsibilities, see OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2005).
31. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
801-971 (2000) [hereinafter CSA].
32. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
33. Id.
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interested party. 34 When a petition is received by the DEA,
the agency begins its own investigation of the drug. Once
the DEA has collected the necessary data, the DEA
Administrator, by authority of the Attorney General,
requests that HHS provide a scientific and medical
evaluation and a recommendation on whether the drug
should be controlled. If HHS recommends that a drug be
controlled, the Department must also recommend which
schedule the drug should be categorized under. 35 In this
process, the HHS Secretary can solicit information from the
Food and Drug Administration, the National Institute on
Drug Abuse, and the scientific and medical community at
large. 36 The Secretary's medical and scientific evaluations
bind the37 DEA with respect to scientific and medical
matters.
The CSA regulates both the controlled substances and
those who handle them. Accordingly, the legislation reaches
actors along the entire chain of distribution, from the
manufacturers who produce the substances, right down
through the physicians who prescribe them, and the
pharmacists who ultimately distribute them. In order to
prescribe controlled substances under the CSA, physicians
must be registered with the DEA and comply with protocols
for the prescription and dispensing of controlled substances
to patients. Like many complex regulatory schemes,
Congress defined many terms used throughout the statute.
For instance, physicians are considered practitioners under
the CSA if they prescribe controlled substances in the
"course of professional practice. 3 8s Similarly, a "valid
prescription" is one "issued for a legitimate medical
purpose. '39 A 1971 federal regulation promulgated by the
Attorney General pursuant to delegated powers under the
CSA further stated that all prescriptions must be issued
"for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual

34. Id. § 811(a)(2).
35. See id. § 811(b).
36. See id. § 823(H)(i).
37. See id.
38. Id. § 802(21); see also 21 C.F.R § 1306.04(a) (2006).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000).
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practitioner
acting in the usual course of his professional
40
practice."
Practioners prescribing controlled substances for other
than legitimate medical purposes are
subject to
deregistration. Prior to 1984, physician registration under
the CSA was little more than a formality if a physician was
licensed by their state medical board. The process of
deregistration could only be commenced under very narrow
circumstances-where the physician had his state license
revoked or was convicted of a felony in relation to controlled
substances. 4 ' In 1984, however, the CSA was amended to
permit the Attorney General to deny or revoke a physician's
registration upon a finding that such registration would be
"inconsistent with the public interest."42 The amendment
provided that in determining whether a physician's
registration under the CSA was inconsistent with the public
interest, the Attorney General shall consider the following
criteria: (1) the recommendations of the physician's state
licensing or disciplinary board; (2) the physician's
experience in dispensing or conducting research with
controlled substances; (3) the physician's conviction record
under both state and federal laws related to controlled
substances; (4) compliance with state, federal, or local laws
related to controlled substances; and finally (5) any other
43
conduct which may threaten the public health and safety.
C. The ODWDA and the CSA: From Legislation to
Litigation
Oregon's Death With Dignity Act first passed in 1994
when fifty-one percent of Oregon voters approved the
measure, 44 but an injunction delayed the implementation of
the law until October 1997. 45 In July of 1997, as Oregonians
were weighing the merits of the legislation in their own
state in preparation for a ballot measure that sought to
40. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2006).
41. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)(2)-(3) (2000).
42. Id. § 824(a)(4).
43. Id. § 824(f).
44. Joseph Cordaro, Who Defers to Whom? The Attorney General Targets
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2477, 2483-84 (2002).

45. See id. at 2484.
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repeal the Act, both houses of Congress overwhelmingly
passed, and President Clinton signed, the Assisted Suicide
Funding Restriction Act (ASFRA)46 which became effective
on July 25, 1997. ASFRA, introduced in the U.S. Senate by
Senators Byron Dorgan and John Ashcroft, prohibited the
use of federal funds for any health care item or service that
is furnished
for the purpose of causing or assisting a
47
suicide.
Perhaps spurred by the momentum of ASFRA, Senator
Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Hyde, Chairmen of
the Senate and House Judiciary Committees respectively,
wrote to the Chief Administrator of the DEA, Thomas A.
Constantine, in July of 1997. The letter asked for his
opinion as to whether State legislation, like that in Oregon
which authorizes the prescription and dispensing of
controlled substances for the express purpose of assisting
suicide, would violate the CSA. 48 The letter went on to cite
various sources ranging from the American Medical
Association to the Health Care Financing Organization in
support of their view that "assisting in a suicide by
prescribing or filling a prescription for a controlled
substance cannot be a 'legitimate medical purpose.' 49 In
response, Mr. Constantine-relying on "a number of cases,
briefs, law review articles, and state law," 50 as well as a
review of prior administrative cases in which physicians
were deregistered for dispensing scheduled substances for
other than legitimate medical purposes-concluded that
delivering, dispensing, or prescribing a controlled substance
with the intent of assisting a suicide would not qualify as ' 51
a
legitimate medical purpose under "any current definition.
While Constantine apologized for the delay in his response,
it is noteworthy that the letter is dated on November 5,
1997, exactly one day after Oregon voters defeated a second

46. Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-08 (2000).
47. See id. This includes Medicare and Medicaid appropriations.
48. See Letter from Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Hyde to
Thomas A. Constantine, Chief Adm'r, DEA (July 29, 1997), in S. REP. No. 105372, at 7 & n.6 (1998).
49. Id.
50. Letter from Thomas A. Constantine, Chief Adm'r, DEA, to Senator Orrin
Hatch (Nov. 5, 1997), in S. REP. No. 105-372, at 8-9 & n.9 (1998).
51. See id.
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ballot measure that sought to repeal 52the ODWDA by a
margin of sixty percent to forty percent.
On April 2, 1998, after the ink had dried on the Oregon
ballots and after a barrage of letters from Congress urging
both support and resistance for the enforcement of the CSA
against physicians who assist in suicides pursuant to state
law, then-Attorney General Janet Reno took the position
that "the federal government's pursuit of adverse actions
against Oregon physicians who fully comply with that
state's Death With Dignity Act would be beyond the
purpose of the CSA." 53 Attorney General Reno's refusal to
commence deregistration actions against Oregon physicians
rested on her conclusion that nothing in the CSA evinces a
congressional intent to "displace the states as the primary
regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state's
determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical
practice in the absence of a federal law prohibiting that
54
practice."
Following Attorney General Reno's decision not to
enforce the CSA against Oregon, legislation known as the
Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998 55 was introduced
in Congress. This bill, if passed, would have effectively
preempted the ODWDA. When it failed to reach the floor of
either the House or Senate, another bill known as the Pain
Relief Promotion Act (PRPA)56 was introduced. The PRPA
would have amended the CSA to provide increased funding
and support for palliative care, while prohibiting the use of
controlled substances for the "purpose of causing death or
assisting another person in causing death. ' 57 Moreover,
52. The total number of votes against repeal of the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act was 666,275, while the total number of votes for repeal was
445,830. The vote totals on State Measure 51 are available from the Oregon
Secretary of State online at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov497/other.
infor/m5 labst.htm.
53. Letter from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen., to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (June 5, 1998), in S. REP. No. 105-372, at 10
(1998).
54. Id.
55. The Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th Cong.
(1998); S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998).
56. Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999); S.
1272, 106th Cong. (1999).
57. S. 1272, at 2.
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PRPA directed the Attorney General to give no "force and
effect to State law authorizing or permitting assisted
suicide"5 8 when determining what uses of a controlled
substance are in the public interest. The Act passed the
House, 59 but never reached the floor of the Senate for a
vote.
By November 2001, the country had a new President and a new
Attorney General, John Ashcroft. On November 6, 2001, just about
four years to the day that Oregon voters approved the ODWDA,
Attorney General Ashcroft issued his Interpretive Rule that
provided in pertinent part that: Assisting suicide is not a
"legitimate medical purpose" within the meaning of 21 CFR §
1306.04 (2001), and that prescribing, dispensing, or administering
federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the CSA.
Such conduct by a physician registered to dispense controlled
substances may "render his registration . . .inconsistent with the
public interest" and therefore subject to possible suspension or
revocation under 21 U.S.C. 824 (a)(4). This conclusion applies
regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits such conduct
by practitioners ....60

This Interpretive Rule supported the DEA's 1997
conclusion that controlled substances may not be prescribed
and dispensed to assist suicides and directly contradicted
his predecessor's conclusion that "adverse action against a
physician who has assisted in a suicide in full compliance
with the Oregon Act would not be authorized by the CSA. '6 1
The Interpretive Rule encouraged the DEA to undertake
immediate enforcement, and even suggested that the
process could be expedited by using Oregon's own state
provisions under the ODWDA to "identify cases in which
federally controlled substances are used to assist suicide. '62

58. Id.
59. The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 passed the House by a vote of
237-174.

60. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
61. Letter from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen., supra note 53, at 9.
62. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607, 56,608 (Dep't of Justice Nov. 9, 2001). In the Attorney General's opinion,
using Oregon's own records would make the process more expedient and could
give the DEA the information it needed "without having to review patient
medical records or otherwise investigate doctors." Id.
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On November 7, 2001, the State of Oregon commenced
an action in U.S. district court for declaratory and
injunctive relief to enjoin the enforcement of the
Interpretive Rule. Judge Jones held that the CSA does not
authorize the U.S. Justice Department to effectively
overturn the Oregon law through the interpretation of an
administrative statute that attempts to define the meaning
of "legitimate medical purpose. 63a Citing the failure of the
Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act or its successor the Pain
Relief Prevention Act, Judge Jones characterized the
Interpretive Rule as an attempt to "get through the
administrative door that which they [opponents of the
ODWDA and physician-assisted
suicide] could not get
'64
through the congressional door.
Attorney General Ashcroft filed a timely appeal with
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A three-judge panel
held that the Interpretive Rule was unlawful and
unenforceable because it "lacks clear congressional
authority" 65 and "violates the plain language of the CSA. ' 66
After the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc,
the Attorney General filed a petition for certiorari with the
U.S. Supreme Court. He announced his retirement that
afternoon.

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GONZALES V.
OREGON

The substantive issues surrounding physician-assisted
suicide in Gonzales v. Oregon take a back seat to the
narrow question of whether the Attorney General has
permissibly construed the Controlled Substances Act and
its implementing regulations to prohibit the distribution of
federally controlled substances for the purpose of assisting
suicides. In a six-three decision, the Supreme Court held
that the CSA does not authorize the Attorney General to

63. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (D. Or. 2002).
64. Id. at 1093.
65. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004).
66. Id.
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prohibit physicians from prescribing scheduled drugs under
the Oregon Death With Dignity Act.
A. Summary of the Majority Opinion
The majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy and
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, began with a careful statement that narrowed the
decisional grounds. The Court announced that while the
dispute that gave rise to the suit was a product of "political
and moral debate," 67 the resolution was one of
straightforward statutory interpretation.
The Court first pointed out that the ODWDA was
enacted pursuant to a voter referendum and survived a
ballot measure to repeal the legislation. Having thus
established the legislation's popular roots, the Court briefly
recounted the factual history with considerable space
devoted to the fact that, in a span of just four years, two
Attorney Generals had come to two disparate conclusions
regarding whether the CSA permitted deregistration of
physicians who prescribed controlled substances for the
purpose of assisting suicide pursuant to Oregon law. Where
Attorney General Reno found that the CSA did not
authorize her office to "displace the states as the primary
regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state's
determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical
practices," 68 Attorney General Ashcroft unequivocally found
that "assisting suicide is not a 'legitimate medical purpose'
within the meaning of 21 C.F.R. 1306.04 (2001),"69 an
administrative regulation promulgated under the CSA.
The Court defined two questions that needed to be
decided to resolve the present dispute between the Federal
Government and the State of Oregon. The first was what
degree of deference, if any, should be afforded the Attorney
General's substantive conclusions about the meaning of
"legitimate medical purposes" within the meaning of 21
CFR 1306.04 (2001) (the "Regulation"). The second
question, and arguably the more fundamental one, was
67. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904, 911 (2006).
68. Letter from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen., supra note 53, at 10.
69. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
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whether the Regulation that the Interpretive Rule purports
to further define is authorized by the statutory provisions of
the CSA.
The Government first argued that the Attorney
General's Interpretive Rule was an elaboration on a 1971
Attorney General Regulation that required all prescriptions
be issued for a "legitimate medical purpose," 70 and as such
was entitled to considerable deference in accordance with
the Supreme Court's decision in Auer v. Robbins.71 At issue
in Auer was whether a class of law enforcement officers
were due overtime pay in accordance with the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. The Secretary of Labor wrote an
amicus brief to the Court stating that the officers were
exempt from overtime pay because they met the "salary
basis test" that had been set out in a previous regulation
promulgated by the Secretary. 72 The Court found the
Secretary's interpretation controlling because the salary
basis test was a "creature of the Secretary's own
regulations" 73 and his interpretation of that test
represented the "considerable experience and expertise the
Department of Labor had acquired over time with respect to
the complexities of the Fair Labor Standards Act. '74
The Court reasoned that unlike the Secretary of Labor's
interpretation of the salary basis test in Auer, the Attorney
General's interpretation of what constituted a "legitimate
medical purpose" pursuant to the Regulation was not
controlling because the language in that Regulation did not
give specificity to the CSA's statutory scheme, or reflect the
considerable experience of the Department of Justice. 75
Instead, the Court found that the Regulation's decree that
prescriptions only be issued "for a legitimate medical
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual

70. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2006).
71. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
72. See id. at 454.
73. Id. at 461.
74. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 915 (2006).
75. See id.
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course of his professional practice" 76 ' did
"restate the terms of the statute itself. 77 little more than
The Court also found that the Attorney General's
Interpretive Rule was not entitled to Auer deference
because his authority to issue the Rule, and thus deregister
physicians whose registration runs contrary to the public
interest, was not granted until 1984, nearly thirteen years
after the Regulation was originally promulgated. 78 As the
Attorney
General
could
not have foreseen
this
deregistration authority in 1971 when he originally issued
the Regulation, the 1999 Interpretive Rule cannot be said to
embody the intent of the Attorney General at that time.
With Auer deference thus foreclosed, the Court turned
to whether the Interpretive Rule was entitled to Chevron79
deference. Such deference is appropriate only when
Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to an agency
and the rule in question is promulgated pursuant to that
authority. The Court found that rather than delegating
broad rulemaking authority to the Attorney General,
Congress chose instead to strictly limit his authority to
"registration"8 0 and "control."8' According to the Court's
reading of the statutory text, the words "control" and
"'registration" are severely limited and not subject to their
colloquial definitions. The Court interpreted the statute to
define "control" as the ability to "add a drug or other
substance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule under part
B of this subchapter, whether by transfer from another
schedule or otherwise. '82 The Court conceded that the word
''control" is used outside the scheduling context and that the
Attorney General was given the authority to establish

76. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2006).
77. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 915.
78. Id. at 916 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512
(1994) for the proposition that Auer deference is not warranted when a current
interpretation of a regulation is counter to intent at the time of regulation's
promulgation).
79. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
80. See 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).

81. See id.
82. Id. § 802(5).
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controls "against diversion. '8 3 This power, however, cannot
be said to give the Attorney General the expansive
authority to define diversion by reference to his own views
on what does and does not constitute legitimate medical
practice.8 4 Therefore, the Interpretive Rule, which
endeavors to do just that, cannot be entitled to Chevron
deference.
Similarly, the registration provisions that permit the
Attorney General
to
deregister physicians
whose
registration does not accord with the public interest,8 5 does
not confer broad discretion. In determining whether a
physician's registration is in the public interest, the
86
Attorney General must undertake a five factor analysis
that includes the licensing state's recommendations,
compliance with federal, state, and local laws concerning
controlled substances, as well as public health and safety.
The Interpretive Rule declared prescribing practices that
are legal under Oregon law to be a federal crime. Because
this power far exceeded the Attorney General's authority, it
was not deserving of any judicial deference. The Court
reasoned that it would be inconsistent for Congress to have
"so painstakingly described the Attorney General's limited
authority to deregister a single physician or schedule a
single drug, but to have given him, just by implication,
authority to declare an entire class of activity outside 'the
course of professional practice,' and therefore a criminal
violation of the CSA.''s
The Court found no argument with the fact that the
Attorney General's deregistration power carries an
implication of criminal enforcement. This enforcement,
however, would only be triggered if a physician dispensed a
controlled substance after he was deregistered. The
problem for the Court was that the Interpretive Rule works
"in the opposite direction" 88 by declaring certain conduct
criminal and thus triggering deregistration. The fatal flaw

83. Id.

§ 823(a)(1).

84. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 916 (2006).
85. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2000).
86. See id. §§ 823(f)(1)-(5).
87. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 918.
88. Id.

20071

ON DEATH AND DEFERENCE

1655

with the Interpretive Rule was that it presumed that the
Attorney General, on his own, could decide what constitutes
a violation of the CSA. If this were true, the Court
reasoned, the Attorney General could not only determine
compliance with the law, but could also interpret what the
law is. While the Court did not say so explicitly, it seems
clear that such sweeping power would infringe on 8 the
traditional province of the judiciary to interpret the law. 9
The majority decision also rested heavily on the overall
structure of the CSA. The Court viewed the CSA as setting
up a bifurcated regulatory scheme that involves both the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, with
authority over legal and medical issues respectively. Put
another way, the division of labor was squarely drawn, with
the Secretary making medical decisions and the Attorney
General making legal decisions. 90 The Court found evidence
for this conclusion throughout the CSA, but singled out the
provision that gives the Secretary of Health and Human
Services the authority to determine the acceptable methods
of professional practice in the medical treatment of drug
addiction. 9 1
The majority also found that congressional commentary
following the enactment of the CSA did not support the
Attorney General's claimed authority to regulate medical
practice. When debating ratification of the United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Congress decided
that the Convention would have to be integrated into the
CSA's procedures and that "nothing in the Convention will
interfere with ethical medical practice in this country as
determined by the Secretary .... ,,92 Importantly, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, not the Attorney
General, is delegated the task of ascertaining the ethics of
professional medical practice.
Also unavailing was the Government's argument that
the Attorney General's decision to deregister physicians
89. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
90. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 920.

91. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(g) (2000) (stating that the Attorney General shall
register practitioners who dispense drugs for the treatment of narcotics
addictions upon a determination by the Secretary that the applicant is so
qualified).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 801a(3) (2000).
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who prescribe controlled substances in accordance with
ODWDA is a legal rather than a medical one. Here, the
Court's reasoning rests on the Attorney General's
substantial reliance on medical judgments in concluding
that prescribing controlled substances to assist suicide is
not a legitimate medical purpose. 93 The Court pointed out
that the Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum that the
Attorney General appended to his Interpretive Rule
extensively discussed "Federal medical policy" 94 against
physician-assisted suicide. 95 This memorandum also made
medical distinctions between pain management and
actively assisting suicide. The very fact that the Attorney
General had to undertake such research demonstrates that
his claimed authority is both "beyond his expertise and
incongruous with the statutory purposes and design. '96 The
Court maintained that if Congress intended the Attorney
General to have such broad authority over the national
medical policy, they would not have done so in such vague
terms. "Congress," the Court declared, "does not hide ...
elephants in mouseholes. ' '97 As Congress never delegated
such authority, nothing in the Attorney General's
Interpretive Rule was deserving of Chevron deference.
The Attorney General's lack of authority to define the
scope of legitimate medical practice made the Interpretive
Rule non-binding on the Court. While not controlling, the
Interpretive Rule might nonetheless have deserved of some
deference under the Court's decision in Skidmore98 to the
extent that such Rule was thoroughly considered, validly
reasoned, consistent with earlier and later agency
pronouncements, and was otherwise persuasive. 99 The
Court declined to find the Rule persuasive under Skidmore
for a number of reasons.

93. The Attorney General's Interpretive Rule relied heavily on the Office of
Legal Counsel Memorandum he sought prior to issuing his directive to the
DEA.
94. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 921.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
98. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
99. Id. at 140.
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First, the Interpretive Rule did not align with the
overarching goals behind the CSA, a piece of legislation
that the Court said embodies congressional intent to
"conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances." 100 Congress
sought to regulate medical practice in the CSA only to the
extent that it prohibits physicians from utilizing their
prescription privileges to aid drug trafficking, and
manifested no intent to regulate medicine generally, or
physician-assisted suicide specifically. Congress, in fact,
cautioned against concluding that the CSA displaced the
states' regulation of the medical profession by expressly
stating that nothing in the Act should be "construed as
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy
the field .. ."101
The Court found that the ODWDA is "an example of the
state regulation of medical practice that the CSA
presupposes"'102 in the non-preemption clause. The Court
carefully pointed out that Congress is certainly free to set
uniform standards of medical practice, notwithstanding the
fact that such regulation has been traditionally left to the
states. 103 The question, the Court reiterated, was not
whether Congress can regulate a physician's ability to issue
prescriptions for the purpose of assisting suicide, but rather
whether Congress did in fact do so. The Court read the
CSA's silence on the practice of physician-assisted suicide,
its general delegation of medical judgments to the Secretary
of Health, and the non-preemption clause together to
conclude that the Interpretive Rule was "difficult to
defend"'1 4 and therefore lacked the power to persuade.
The Court concluded by stating that it was unnecessary
to reach the clear statement arguments because their
conclusion-that Congress would not grant the Attorney
General the sweeping authority to regulate medical practice

100. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 922 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 12 (2005)).
101. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2000).
102. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 923.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 924.
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through "muffled hints"105- is fundamentally predicated on
1 06
plain old "commonsense.'
B. Summary of the Dissenting Opinion:Justice Scalia
The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, argued that
there are three independent grounds for upholding the
Attorney General's Interpretive Rule.
First, the dissent contended that the Attorney General's
interpretation of "legitimate medical purpose" was
deserving of Auer deference and is, therefore, "controlling
unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation."' 10 7 The attack on the majority's reasoning
started with its creation of an anti-parroting canon which,
the dissent maintained, was wholly unsupported by
8
precedent.10
The dissent then assumed, arguendo, that even if an
anti-parroting doctrine exists, its application would be
misplaced in this instance because the Regulation
represents the Attorney General's interpretation and
clarification of the word "prescription" above and beyond
what is included in the original statute. 09 In an attempt at
humor, the dissent argued that the regulation did not "run
afoul" 110 of the anti-parroting canon and therefore the
Interpretive Rule based on that regulation was controlling
unless it was "plainly erroneous or inconsistent.""' Here,
the dissent maintained that the Attorney General's
conclusion that prescriptions require a medical purpose
that is legitimate under a federal standard is reasonable, in
part, because they came to the same conclusion as the
Court did in Webb v. United States.112 At issue in Webb was
105. Id. at 925.
106. Id.
107. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizen Council, 490 U.S. 337, 359 (1989)).
108. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 927 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 249 U.S. 96 (1919).

2007]

ON DEATH AND DEFERENCE

1659

whether an order for morphine, written to maintain the
recipient's "customary use," was a prescription under the
Harrison Act, 113 a predecessor to the CSA. The Court found
that "to call such an order for the use of morphine a
physician's prescription would be so plain a perversion 114
of
meaning that no discussion of the subject is required."
For Justice Scalia and the other dissenters, there appeared
to be little difference between the facts in Webb and issuing
prescriptions to assist terminally-ill patients to end their
lives under the ODWDA.
The dissent dismissed the majority's narrow definition
of "control" as used in the statutory text. "Control" within
the meaning of the CSA does not mean solely the Attorney
General's ability to add or remove a substance from a
schedule. While this definition of control is consistent with
§ 802, it is incompatible with §§ 821-30, sections that deal
with the "Registration of Manufacturers, Distributors, and
Dispensers of Controlled Substances,"' 1 5 the specific areas
of the Act that the Interpretive Rule addresses. In that
context, the word "control" must necessarily take on its
ordinary meaning-"to exercise restraining or directing
influence over."116 Once the everyday meaning of "control"
is adopted, the Attorney General's conclusion that the
prescription requirement of § 829 "relates to the ... control
of the . . .dispensing of controlled substances" 117 under §
821 is at least reasonable.
The dissent maintained that even if the Attorney
General's Interpretive Rule was not entitled to deference
under the Court's Auer or Chevron precedents, his
interpretation of the regulation was nonetheless the most
reasonable
under
any
objective
inquiry.
This
reasonableness was demonstrated by the extensive thirdparty authority that supports the proposition that assisting
suicide is "fundamentally incompatible with a physician's

113. See id. at 99.
114. Id.

115. 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-30 (2000).
116. Gonzales v.

Oregon, 126

S. Ct. at 930 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 580 (2d ed. 1950)).

117. 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
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role as a healer."'118 According to the dissent, the majority
erred in indulging a normative inquiry into what the
parameters of medical practice should be rather than what
they are. 119
The dissent also took issue with the Court's
"lipservice"'120 to state autonomy. While appearing to reject
the argument that the CSA creates a uniform federal
standard for the legal distribution of controlled substances,
the Court also rejected the opposite argument that any
medical practice authorized by state law is legitimate
within the meaning of CSA. The Court's conclusion that
"legitimate medical purpose," as used in the CSA, refers to
all uses of drugs unrelated to "addiction and recreational
abuse" is in fact based on a "hazily defined federal
standard," extracted selectively from the legislation to serve
the Court's ends. 121 This narrow definition of the CSA is not
a result of sound reasoning, but rather the Court's
purposeful decision to work backward from its desired
result-staking out a middle ground between sweeping
federal standards and unbridled state experimentation.
In the alternative, even if the primary purpose of the
CSA is to curtail drug abuse, there is nothing in the
legislation that suggests this is its singular goal. If that
were the case, the dissent posited, why would Congress
have amended the Act in 1984 to authorize the Attorney
General to deny a physician's registration when such
registration would be "inconsistent with the public
interest"?122 In support of a broader reading of the CSA that
encompasses public health and safety objectives, the dissent
pointed to the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990123 that
classified anabolic steroids as controlled drugs under
Schedule III of the CSA. If the majority's conclusion was
correct, and the CSA's sole purpose was to curtail addiction
118. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 931 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)).
119. Id. at 932.
120. Id. at 933.
121. See id.
122. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2000).
123. The Anabolic Steroids Control Act classified anabolic steroids as
controlled drugs and placed them in Schedule III of the CSA. See 21 U.S.C. §
812 (2000).

2007]

ON DEATH AND DEFERENCE

1661

and recreational abuse, the control of these bodybuilding
drugs would have been impermissible.
Finally, the dissent argued that even if the Attorney
General's Interpretive Rule was an incorrect reading of the
regulation, his independent conclusion that "prescribing,
dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances
• . . by a physician . . . may 'render his registration . . .
inconsistent with the public interest' and therefore subject
to 'possible suspension or revocation"'124 was entitled to
deference under Chevron because the CSA clearly confers
on the Attorney General the authority to interpret the
statutory phrase "public interest" and "public health and
safety."
Congress, the dissent argued, gave the Attorney
General broad discretion to register or deregister physicians
under the CSA. The only limit on this expansive power can
be found in § 823(f), which enumerates five factors which
the Attorney General must weigh. 125 The fifth and broadest
factor explicitly states that the Attorney General shall
consider "such other conduct which may threaten the public
health and safety."126 The dissent took issue with what they
saw as the majority's apparent insistence that all five
factors are to be read in the conjunctive rather than the
disjunctive. Instead, the addition of this fifth factor should
be read to provide the Attorney General with the authority
to interpret the broad phrase "public interest" and exclude
assisted suicide as contrary to such interest. The majority's
conclusion that such a broad delegation cannot encompass
setting a federal standard for medical practice, an
argument grounded on the statute's division of labor
between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health,
was dismissed by the dissent as untenable. 127 The fact that
Congress gave the Secretary explicit responsibilities in the
area of scheduling and addiction treatment, but not in the
sections of the statute that pertain to the registration of
physicians, leads to the unassailable conclusion that
Congress "envisioned no role for the Secretary in that
124. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
125. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2000).
126. Id.
127. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904, 937 (2006).
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area." 128 The Attorney General, having been charged by
Congress with the sole responsibility to register physicians
in accordance with the public interest, is well within his
authority to give notice to those physicians that a decision
to prescribe controlled substances to assist suicides could
make their further registration under the CSA contrary to
public interest, the dissent concluded.
C. Summary of the Dissenting Opinion: Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent that was
sympathetic to the position that the CSA should be limited
by federalism principles. Nonetheless, he ultimately
concluded that such arguments were now "water over the
dam"'129 given the Court's decision just last term in
Gonzales v. Raich.130 In Raich, the Court held that the CSA
authorized the Attorney General to prohibit the purely
intrastate possession of marijuana that was legal under
California law.131 According to Justice Thomas, the
majority's characterization of the scope of the CSA in this
case differed markedly from the Court's characterization of
the same legislation in Raich. The statute had been
somehow
been
transformed
from
a broad
and
"comprehensive regulatory regime specifically designed to
regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for
1 32 to a statute of
medicinal purposes, and in what manner,"
limited reach concerned primarily with "drug abuse"' 33 as it
relates to "addiction or abnormal effects on the nervous
system."134
While Justice Thomas found the expansive scope of the
CSA and the Attorney General's sweeping powers therein
128. Id.
129. Id. at 941 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
131. See id. at 7. Prior to Raich, the California Compassionate Use Act
allowed physicians to prescribe marijuana. The state deemed the use of
marijuana for documented medical purposes was legitimate even though the
substance was listed on Schedule I of the CSA as having no such legitimate
medical use.
132. See id. at 27 (emphasis added).
133. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 940.
134. Id.
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"troubling,"'135 such results, he lamented, are "merely the
inevitable and inexorable consequence of the Court's
Commerce
Clause
and
separation-of-powers
jurisprudence.' 1 36 In the final analysis, Justice Thomas
dissented not because he is a proponent of unchecked
federal power, but because he believed that the majority
was now furthering the same constitutional arguments,
albeit under the "guise of statutory interpretation,"' 37 that
the Court found wanting only a mere seven months ago in
Raich.
IV. A DIALOGUE ON DEFERENCE

The Supreme Court's refusal to defer to the Attorney
General's Interpretive Rule represents a departure from the
modern tendency of the Court to afford a high degree of
deference to administrative rulemaking. In fact, one
commentator has pointed out that in its final term of the
twentieth century, the Court consistently sounded "a steady
drum beat; a drum beat of deference.' 38 The decisions on
which this characterization is based run the gamut of
subject matter and include everything from an agency's
right to have the first chance to review constitutional
challenges to its regulations, 39 to upholding a government
decision to seize range fixtures from ranchers and their
creditors. 14° Leading the charge in favor of agency deference
is Justice Scalia, the author of the primary dissent, who has
shown a willingness to do away with Skidmore deference
entirely, and to expand Chevron deference beyond
traditional notice-and-comment
rulemaking,
to any
authoritative agency ruling including letters, decisions, 41
and
even no-action notices published in the federal register.'

135. Id. at 940.
136. Id. (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) and Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)).
137. Id. at 941.
138. Allen E. Shoenberger, October Term, 1999: The Supreme Court's Last
Term of the Twentieth Century, IncreasingDeference to Administrative Agencies,
21 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 213, 234 (2001).
139. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000).
140. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
141. See Christiensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000).
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Many of the Court's recent decisions in support of
agency deference tend to be close five-four majorities 142 and
are highly technical. While the spread on the Gonzales v.
Oregon decision was six-three, the Court's analysis is
characteristically technical and largely devoted to detailed
interpretation of statutory language and its implications.
Behind the technical language and the pages of close
statutory analysis aimed at ascertaining the meaning of
words such as "prescription" and "public interest," lies a
simple idea-that the federalism-inspired clear statement
rule should trump agency deference. While the Court finds
143
that Congress would not "hide elephants in mouseholes"
by conferring on the Attorney General the broad authority
to set national medical policy through vague CSA
registration provisions, the Court makes only a passing
reference to the structural federalism concerns that are also
clearly implicated. The Court devotes only a mere
paragraph at the end of a thirteen page opinion to what it
calls the "background principles of our federal system"
which "belie the notion that Congress would use such an
obscure grant of authority to regulate areas traditionally
supervised by the States' police power." 144 Rather than
elaborate on the point, the Court simply makes the
statement that "it is unnecessary even to consider the
application of clear statement requirements. ' 145 The Court's
seeming reluctance to make an explicit federalism
argument in favor of a sometimes excruciating dialogue on
deference leaves one to wonder if the Court is hiding a few
elephants of its own.
In failing to deal explicitly with the clear statement
requirement, the Court mirrored the Ninth Circuit's
approach below. When Oregon sought injunctive relief from
enforcement of the Attorney General's Interpretive Rule,
the Ninth Circuit granted that request in part because it
found that the Rule "interferes with Oregon's authority to
regulate medical care within its borders,"146 and thus
"alters the 'usual constitutional balance between the States
142. Shoenberger, supra note 138, at 213.
143. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 921 (2006).
144. Id. at 925.
145. Id.
146. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004).
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and the Federal Government."'14 7 In short, because the
Attorney General's interpretation of the CSA gave rise to
federalism concerns, Judge Tallman, writing for the
majority, invoked the "clear statement rule," holding that
Congress must be "unmistakably clear" when it intends 14
to8
trespass on areas traditionally left to states' police power.
Thus, while the Ninth Circuit's decision rested in large part
on the conclusion that the CSA failed to evince a clear
statement from Congress regarding their intention to
regulate physician-assisted suicide, the implicit arguments
that such a clear statement requirement overrides agency
deference
"remained
no more than an unspoken
149
assumption."
While the Court declined to put forward a clear
statement argument in any detail, it is quite apparent that
if Congress intends the CSA to sweep broadly enough to
prohibit physician-assisted suicide, it must say so explicitly,
either by directly prohibiting the practice or by empowering
the Attorney General with such authority. The Court
admitted that there is "no question that the Federal
150 of
Government can set uniform national standards"
health and safety despite the traditional entrustment of
those matters to the states. What they cannot do, however,
is alter the CSA's scope to prohibit physician-assisted
suicide through "muffled hints."151 Whether Congress will
speak louder on the matter is yet to be seen.
A. The Future of the Oregon Experiment: Prospectsfor
CongressionalAction
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision there is
certainly a temptation to get overly sanguine about the
future of the national dialogue on physician-assisted suicide
specifically, and end of life issues more generally. Such

147. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)).
148. See id. at 1125.
149. Recent Case: Administrative Law-Ninth Circuit Holds that Attorney
General's Directive Criminalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide Exceeded
Authority Under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1371,

1375 (2005).
150. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 923.
151. Id. at 925.
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optimism would likely be premature given the history of
congressional attempts to defeat the Oregon Death With
Dignity Act and the reluctance of state legislatures to
engage in a dialogue about PAS legislation. Importantly,
the Interpretive Rule that gave rise to Gonzales v. Oregon
was only issued after several attempts to pass federal law
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide failed to gain
momentum.
1. The Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act. On June 5,
1998, the same day that then-Attorney General Janet Reno
announced that the CSA did not permit the DEA to prohibit
doctors acting pursuant to ODWDA from writing lethal
prescriptions to assist terminally-ill individuals with ending
their lives, Representative Henry Hyde proposed new
legislation, the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998
(LDAPA).15 2 Senator Nickles, Senator Lott, and eleven
other senators introduced a companion bill in the Senate. 153
In a statement before the House, Representative Hyde
portrayed assisted suicide as a natural result of the
"slippery slope" entered into when the Supreme Court
"sanctified abortion [as a] preferred option."'154 Senator
Nickles stated before the Senate that the enactment of the
LDAPA would ensure that federal authorization to
prescribe DEA-regulated drugs does not include the
authority to prescribe such drugs to cause death. 155 The
LDAPA would have amended § 303 and § 304 of the
Controlled Substances Act to provide for the suspension or
revocation of a physician's license if that physician had
"intentionally dispensed or distributed a controlled
substance with a purpose of causing, or assisting in

152. H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998).
153. See S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998). Both the House and Senate bills
followed on the heels of the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, 42
U.S.C. § 14403 (2000), legislation which prohibits the use of federal funds for
assisting a suicide, mercy killing, or euthanasia.
154. Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998: Hearingon H.R. 4006 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1
(1998) (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman Pro Tempore, Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary).
155. See Drugs, Dignity, and Death: Physician-AssistedSuicide? Hearing on
S. 2151 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14 (1998) (statement of
Sen. Don Nickles).
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causing, the suicide or euthanasia of any individual." 156
License revocation would not apply where a physician
prescribed or distributed a controlled substance for "the
purpose of alleviating pain or discomfort (even if the use of
the controlled substance may increase the risk of death), so
long as the controlled substance is not also dispensed or
distributed for the purpose of causing, or assisting in
causing, the death of an individual for any reason."'157 The
Attorney General would have had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that a physician intended to cause
death. 158 This approach is consistent with the tendency of
U.S. Courts to make distinctions between pain management
that may inadvertently end a life and actions taken with
the express intent to hasten death. 159 Significantly, the
legislation was opposed by the American Medical
Association (AMA), in part because of fears that doctors
would be reluctant to prescribe adequate pain relief for
suffering patients. 160 The legislation was sent to committee
and never emerged.
2. The Pain Relief Promotion Act. The battle to end the
Oregon experiment did not stop with the failure of the
Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act. Senator Nickles
introduced the Pain Relief Promotion Act (PRPA) in the
Senate' 6 1 in June of 1999, concurrently with Representative
Hyde who introduced the bill in the House. 162 Senator
Nickles testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the PRPA legislation was designed to respond to the
concerns of the medical community that arose with the
156. Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th Cong.
§ 2(b)(4) (1998).
157. Id.
158. See id. § 2(a)(2).
159. See David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Rejecting Assisted Suicide but EmbracingEuthanasia,337 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1236, 1237 (1997); see also Brett Kingsbury, A Line Already Drawn: The
Case for Voluntary Euthanasia After the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining
Hydration and Nutrition, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 201, 236-38 (2004).
160. See, e.g., David Orentlicher & Arthur Caplan, The Pain Relief
Promotion Act of 1999: A Serious Threat to Palliative Care, 283 J.AM. MED.
ASS'N 255, 258 (2000).
161. See Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, S. 1272, 106th Cong. (1999).
162. See Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999).

1668

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

introduction of the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act.163
Accordingly, PRPA had three main goals: (1) to make clear
that the Controlled Substances Act prohibited the use of
federally controlled substances to assist suicides; (2) to
promote greater understanding of pain management and
palliative care in the medical and law enforcement
community; and (3) to gain the support of the National
Hospice Association and the American Medical Association
who had voiced opposition to the LDAPA. 1 4 The Act
consisted of two major titles. Title I amended the Controlled
Substances Act to prohibit physician-assisted suicide, while
Title II was designed to promote palliative care, education,
and research. The Pain Relief Promotion Act attempted to
differentiate between the practice of prescribing drugs that
may have the incidental effect of hastening death and the
practice of prescribing drugs for the express purpose of
causing death by making clear that "alleviating pain or
discomfort in the usual course of professional practice is a
legitimate medical purpose for which dispensing,
distributing, or administering a controlled substance that is
consistent with public health and safety, even if16the
use of
such a substance may increase the risk of death." 5
Unlike its predecessor, the Pain Relief Promotion Act
succeeded in gaining the support of both the AMA and the
National Hospice Association. The AMA undertook an
independent legal analysis of the legislation and concluded
that it would be "incorrect to suggest that the 'Pain Relief
Promotion Act of 1999' is no different than the bill
introduced by the same sponsors in the last Congress, the
'Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998."'166 This
analysis went on to point out that while the latter bill "cited
participation in physician-assisted suicide as a reason to
revoke a physician's Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) registration, and specifically permitted revocation or
denial of registration if the DEA believed there was reason

163. The Pain Relief Promotion Act: Hearing on H.R. 2230 Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Sen. Don Nickles).
164. See id.
165. Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999).
166. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ANALYSIS OF S.1272 / H.R. 2260-THE
NICKLES/HYDE "PAIN RELIEF PROMOTION ACT OF 1999" (1999), http://www.ama-

assn.org/ama/upload/mm/399/leg1099.pdf.
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to suspect a physician's intention was to assist a suicide,"
PRPA, "explicitly acknowledges the medical legitimacy of
the 'double effect' in the CSA and provides a new and
important statutory protection for physicians prescribing
controlled substances for pain, particularly for patients at
the end of life." 167 The AMA goes on to assure its members
that this "significant improvement to the CSA largely
rectifies the AMA's concern about last year's bill [the Lethal
Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998] regarding the potential
to chill appropriately aggressive prescribing for pain
management." 168
This official support notwithstanding, some state
medical societies dissented from the AMA, stating that the
legislation would actually have a chilling effect on pain
management because physicians-concerned over increased
scrutiny over pain management-would be reluctant to
aggressively treat pain management in the terminally-ill. 6 9
Particularly troublesome was section 102 of the Act, which
provided for the training of law enforcement "on the
necessary and legitimate use of controlled substances in
pain management and palliative care ..
".."170
Giving law
enforcement officers with no clinical education on medical
decision making would, according to one advocacy group,
invite
'misunderstanding
and
misidentification
of
violations."' 1 71 Dr. David Orentlicher of the Center of Law
and Health at Indiana University and former director of the
AMA's Division of Medical Ethics, testified before the House
Judiciary Committee, that the passage of PRPA would
likely discourage pain management rather than encourage
it, stating "[n]o matter how many words you attempt to
write into this Act to define and encourage good pain
management and palliative care, the reality of the practice
of medicine all over the country is that doctors would rather
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Pain Relief Promotion Act: Hearing on S. 1272 Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (Apr. 25, 2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Judiciary Comm.), available at http://leahy.
senate.gov/press/200004/000427e.html.
170. Pain Relief Promotion Act, S. 1272, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999).
171. Steven J. Baumrucker, Should We Fear the Pain Relief PromotionAct?
AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE, July-Aug. 2000, at 224, 225 (quoting the
American Academy of Family Practice).
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avoid risk, interrogation, and investigation at all costs. ' 172
Dr. Orentlicher had previously expressed concern that the
legislation required law enforcement officers to ascertain,
after the fact, what a physician's intent was when
prescribing pain medication and opined that "physicians
must worry that law enforcement
officers will see a criminal
173
intent where none existed."'
The disparate goals of the legislation probably
contributed to its demise. Even commentators that
applauded the legislation's support of palliative care were
skeptical of the decision to promote pain management and
prohibit physician-assisted suicide in the same piece of
legislation.174 It appeared as though Congress was
attempting to strike down a single law in a single state by
exposing doctors all over the country to enhanced scrutiny
and quite possibly criminal prosecution. 175 This killing a fly
with a sledge hammer approach proved too much. At the
beginning of the 2000 congressional session, passage of
PRPA in the Senate appeared imminent, but opponents
rallied for a further examination of the bill's costs and
objectives. 176 The result was that the legislation failed to
reach the floor for a full vote before the session adjourned.
B. The Futureof Oregon's Experiment: Prospects for State
Action
Perhaps contributing to congressional acquiescence
thus far, is the reluctance of most states to introduce or
pass legislation that would legalize physician-assisted
suicide. Oregon is not the first state to attempt to legalize
PAS, but it is the first to succeed. The states of Washington,

172. Pain Relief Promotion Act: Hearingon H.R. 2260 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the H. Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of David
Orentlicher, Professor, Indiana University School of Law).
173. Orentlicher & Caplan, supra note 160, at 255.
174. One commentator noted that it seemed as if"the palliative care aspects
were merely tacked on to make a bill striking down the Oregon law more
palatable (and thereby 'passable')." Baumrucker, supra note 171, at 225.
175. Id.
176. See generally 106 CONG. REC. S13156 (daily ed. Oct. 26,
(statement of Sen. Wyden).
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California, and Michigan 177 all attempted to pass
referendums on PAS before Oregon, and all failed. In 1991,
Washington became the first state to hold a referendum on
the practice. The legislature introduced Proposition 119
which attempted to amend the state's 1979 Natural Death
Act (the nation's second living-will legislation). 178 The
question on the ballot was plainly, "[s]hall adult patients
who are in a medically terminal condition be permitted to
request and receive from a physician aid-in-dying?"'179 The
ambiguous phrase "aid-in-dying," together with what
opponents called a lack of "safeguards," likely contributed
to the Proposition's defeat. 180 When the final tally was
taken, the Proposition garnered forty-six percent of the 1.5
million votes cast. 181 On January 24th, shortly after
Gonzales v. Oregon was handed down, Senator Thibaudeau
and other senators introduced the "Washington Death With
Dignity Act," a bill patterned on the Oregon Death With
Dignity Act. 182 It died in committee.
In 1992, California became the second state to attempt
to pass some version of a physician-suicide law by
referendum. The first proposition-California's Proposition
161-was authored by the Hemlock Society, 183 the same
organization that created Washington's Proposition 119,
but this time the proposition spelled out the meaning of
"aid-in-dying." Interestingly, the definition left room for
PAS and active euthanasia. Proposition 161 notably
established some safeguards that were missing from the
Washington Proposition, including the requirement that
177. The State of Michigan held a referendum on PAS in 1998 and the
measure failed by a seventy-one percent to twenty-nine percent margin. State of
Michigan, Department of State, Official 1998 Election Results for State
Proposal B, http://miboecfr.nicusa.comlelection/results/98gen/90000002.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
178. Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (2005).
179. George Annas, Death by Prescription: The Oregon Initiative, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED., 1240, 1240 (1994).
180. See id.

181. Rob Carson, Washington's 1-119, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Mar.-Apr. 1992,
at 7, 7.
182. See S.B. 6843, 59th Leg. (Wash. 2006).
183. The Hemlock Society has since changed its name to "Compassion and
Choices." See Compassion and Choices, http://www.compassionandchoices.
org/aboutus/themovement.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
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written directives be witnessed and that records on the
program be regularly transmitted to the California State
Department of Health Services. 8 4 The California
Proposition was defeated by a margin of fifty-four percent to
forty-six percent. 185
Since Proposition 161 was defeated, California has
made several other attempts to pass PAS legislation. The
state's most recent attempt at legalizing the practice is
entitled the "Compassionate Choice Act."18 6 The legislation
is patterned on the Oregon Death With Dignity Act and if
passed, would allow a physician to prescribe a selfadministered, life-ending drug to an adult who requested it,
had been found by two doctors to be mentally competent,
and was within six months of death. The bill was
introduced in the Assembly in February 2005, and passed
by a vote of 48-30 in May of that same year. 8 7 On June 27,
2006, the California Senate Judiciary Committee voted
would not
down the legislation, assuring that the legislation
88
have a hearing in front of the full Senate.
Washington and California are not alone in persevering
to pass physician-assisted suicide legislation. The states of
Arizona, Maine, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Wisconsin have also introduced Death With Dignity
legislation. Two states, Vermont and Hawaii, have long
histories of entertaining PAS legislation. In Vermont,
legislation patterned on the Oregon Death With Dignity Act
was introduced in 2003, 2005, and 2007.189 The 2007
184. See Annas, supra note 179, at 1240-41.
185. Patrick M. Curran, Jr., Regulating Death: Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act and Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 86 GEO. L.J. 725, 727 (1998).
186. A.B. 651, 2005-06 Leg. Sess. (Ca. 2005).
187. The California Assembly vote tally for A.B. 651 is available at the
California State Legislature webpage, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0506/billlasm/ab_0651-0700/ab651bill20061130_history.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2007).
188. The California Senate Judiciary vote tally is available at the California
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0651webpage,
Senate
State
(last visited Feb. 25,
0700/ab_651_vote_20060627_000003_sen_comm.html
2007).
189. In 2003, Vermont's legislature considered several measures on both
sides of the issue. Two bills (S.112 and S. 181) would have made PAS legal, one
bill (H. 275) would have prohibited the practice. In 2005, the "Vermont Death
With Dignity Act" (H. 168) was introduced and died in committee.
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legislation is entitled "Patient Choice and Control at the
End of Life" and is now being considered by the Human
Services Committee. 190 Similarly, PAS legislation was
introduced in Hawaii in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and
2007.191 Hawaii's 2007 Death With Dignity legislation was
introduced concurrently in the 192
House on January 22nd and
in the Senate on January 24th.
In the eight years since the Supreme Court issued an
invitation to the states to continue the democratic debate
around the right to die, 193 no state outside of Oregon has
legalized the practice of physician-assisted suicide. In fact,
with the addition of Maryland in 1999,194 forty states now
explicitly prohibit assisting a suicide by statute while still
others forbid the practice by operation of common law. 195
Interestingly, most of these states, including Maryland,
continue to couple physician-assisted suicide with assisted
suicide in general, failing to make any principled distinction
between the two. This trend, together with the inability of
state legislatures to move Death With Dignity legislation
out of committee in the wake of the Gonzales v. Oregon
decision, suggests that a large scale national debate on the
wisdom or imprudence of physician-assisted suicide will
remain illusive.
CONCLUSION

The profound moral, legal, and ethical issues that
surround the end of human life are deeply felt and strongly
argued as evidenced in events that culminated in the
190. H. 0044, 2007 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2007).
191. For a comprehensive history on Death With Dignity legislation for
Hawaii and other states see, Professor Valerie Vollmar's Physician Assisted
Suicide Website, http://www.willamette.edu/wucllpas/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2007).
192. See S.B. 1995, 24th Leg. Sess. (Ha. 2007); H.B. 675, 24th Leg. Sess.
(Ha. 2007).
193. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 797 (1997). The Court noted
that their decision "permits this debate to continue as it should in a democratic
society." Id.
194. See 21 MD. CODE ANN. § 416 (2007).

195. See Nightingale Alliance, Chart of Legal Status of Assisted
Suicide/Euthanasia in the United States, http://www.nightingalealliance.org/
pdf/state-grid.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
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Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Oregon. The
emergence of the Oregon model has confronted the
American people with the issue of physician-assisted
suicide, and more broadly with the issue of dignity at the
end of life. To say that the conversation has proved
would be an understatement. This
uncomfortable
discomfort with the substance of the conversation is
reflected in seemingly small matters such as syntax. For
example, in Oregon, the advocacy group Compassion and
Choices has expended energy persuading the state to
remove the word "suicide" from all references to the Death
With Dignity Act, while other advocates have lobbied the
Associated Press to make "aid in dying" the preferred
phrase in its stylebook. 196 Given Congress's inability to pass
legislation prohibiting physician-assisted suicide and the
reluctance of other states to join the conversation, Oregon is
still, for now, the only one talking.
The continuation of the Oregon dialogue has its
advantages, not the least of which is that it affords
Americans the opportunity to listen, albeit from a distance.
The process of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon is
highly regulated and the Oregon Department of Human
Services produces a plethora of data about which
terminally-ill patients are seeking to end their lives and
why they are making that choice. 197 The importance of this
data cannot be understated. In fact, much of the data that
has been compiled in the nine years since the law was
enacted undermines the parade of horribles often relied
upon by opponents of physician-assisted suicide. 198 Future
data from Oregon promises to assist bio-ethicists,
196. See Patty Fisher, 'Aid in Dying' Kinder Image Than Suicide, SAN JOSE
MERCURY TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, at lB.

197. The Oregon Department of Human Services is legally required to
collect information regarding compliance with the Act and make information
available on a yearly basis. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.865 (2005). All annual
reports can be found at www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas.
198. Opponents of physician-assisted suicide often suggest that the process
will be over utilized and will become a means by which to rid society of those
who are poor, uneducated, and uninsured. To date, 246 Oregonians have
availed themselves of the practice and according to the Oregon Department of
Human Services, since 2002 the ratio of PAS deaths to total deaths has
remained stable. Additionally, participation rates in PAS are higher among
those with more years of formal education and those with private insurance. See
OREGON DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 23 at 4, 19-24.
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legislators, medical professionals, and the public in parsing
out the facts from the fiction surrounding PAS, but only if
this experiment in end of life choice is allowed to continue
unabated by federal intervention.

